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Abstract
The War on Drugs does not improve health and public safety, but rather serves as a tool of
institutional racism and militarism. Despite increased spending on drug enforcement efforts,
rates of incarceration and overdose deaths remain high. Through analyzing research done on
arrest records in areas such as the state of California; Seattle, Washington; and New Haven,
Connecticut, the disparity in arrests of black and white Americans becomes apparent.
Additionally, analyzing the effectiveness of War on Drugs policies in Afghanistan, Colombia,
and Mexico, reveals ulterior motives for American military intervention. Military intervention
and incarceration have proven ineffective at addressing the drug crisis; however, the effects of
rehabilitation and government programs are both significant and promising. Studies reveal the
benefits of decriminalization and the implementation of programs such as safe injection sites and
needle-exchange programs. As the United States is plagued by the opioid epidemic, finding
effective alternatives to incarceration should be a priority. The United States can take inspiration
from European countries, such as Portugal, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, where
decriminalization has proven to be an effective tool against the drug epidemic.
Keywords: War on Drugs, United States, racism, incarceration, crime
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Introduction
The War on Drugs has done little to combat drug use since it was conceptualized in 1971
and has instead served as a means to imprison minorities and further the goals of the prisonindustrial complex. In 2014, 1,561,231 people were arrested for drug-related offenses in the
United States compared to 580,900 people in 1980 (Coyne & Hall, 2017). Most of these charges
were related to drug possession rather than drug sales. In fact, there were 1.3 million drug
possession arrests reported the following year in 2015 —outnumbering arrests for drug sales six
times (Pearl, 2018). One would think that increased incarceration would lead to decreased crime;
however, a survey conducted by the International Centre for Science in Drug Policy found
evidence that drug prohibition contributes instead to increased crime rates (Coyne & Hall, 2017).
Grecco and Chambers (2019) argue that because addiction is framed as a criminal problem the
healthcare system is widely unprepared to treat addiction. The grim reality of this is highlighted
by the fact that someone in America dies from opioid overdose every 16 minutes (Pearl, 2018).
Between 1972 and 2009, the rate of imprisonment in the United States increased five
times from 93 people incarcerated per 100,000 people to 502 per 100,000 (Maguire, 2010, as
cited in Western & Muller, 2013). Appallingly, black Americans were six to seven times more
likely to be arrested during this period than white Americans (Western & Muller, 2013).
However, black Americans do not report using drugs at a higher rate than white Americans. In
2006, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) reported that
82,587,000 white Americans aged 12 or older had reported using drugs in their lifetime
compared to 12,477,000 black Americans (Fellner, 2009). This means that black people account
for a mere 13% of Americans that have used an illicit drug (Fellner, 2009). Despite this, there are
more black people incarcerated, on probation/parole, or awaiting trial than were enslaved in 1850
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(Butler, 2010). The disproportionate incarceration of black Americans is the greatest human
rights issues that we face in America.
Actions taken to further the agenda of the War on Drugs have had a substantial impact on
health and public safety outside of America, notably in Columbia, Mexico, and Afghanistan.
Since the beginning of American drug war efforts in Colombia, the Colombian National Centre
of Historical Memory estimates that 220,000 people have died or gone missing while an
additional 5.7 million people have been forced to abandon their homes (Guardiola-Rivera &
Koram, 2019). In Mexico, consequences of the War on Drugs, such as counter-narcotics strikes
and increased violence between drug cartels, are attributed with approximately 40,000 deaths
between 2006 and 2011 alone (Mercille, 2011). In Afghanistan, efforts to eradicate opium are
thought to be responsible for a notable increase in violence between 2005 and 2006. During this
time, the number of direct insurgent attacks grew from 1,558 to 4,542 while the number of
reported roadside bombs grew from 783 to 1,677 (Glaze, 2007). Additionally, suicide bombings
increased five times during this same year (Glaze, 2007). Despite this, drug war efforts have not
had a substantial impact on drug production or distribution. In 2016, the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) continued to report Colombia as the world’s largest producer of
cocaine (Mejía, 2016). Likewise, in 2007, UNODC reported that Afghanistan accounted for 80%
of opium produced worldwide (Coyne et al., 2016). Additionally, according to the Drug
Enforcement Administration (2019), “Barring significant, unanticipated changes to the illicit
drug market, Mexican TCOs will continue, in the near term, to dominate the wholesale
importation and distribution of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine, and fentanyl in
U.S. markets'' (p. 109).
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While drug war policies implemented by the United States have done little to impact drug
trafficking and dependency, there is evidence to support alternative approaches outside of
incarceration and military intervention. Upon introducing syringe access programs in the state of
Washington and the District of Columbia, a significant reduction in new HIV, hepatitis B, and
hepatitis C cases was reported (Pearl, 2018). Similarly, a study in Vancouver, British Columbia
found that the introduction of safe injection sites led to a decrease in overdose deaths and an
increase in people seeking substance-abuse treatment over a two-year period (Pearl, 2018).
In addition to syringe access programs and safe injection sites, decriminalizing drug
possession can have a significant impact on health and public safety. In 2001, Portugal
decriminalized the possession of any drug in amounts equal to or less than a ten days’ supply
(Crandall, 2020). Studies have found that since Portugal enacted these policies there has been a
decrease in adolescent drug use, the number of people imprisoned for drug-related crimes, the
number of new HIV and Hepatitis B and C cases, and overdoses (Crandall, 2020). On the other
hand, there has been an increase in the number of people in substance-abuse treatment and the
number of illicit drugs seized by law enforcement (Crandall, 2020). Similar reductions in HIV
transmission were observed in Switzerland after the implementation of the four-pillar model, a
model emphasizing prevention, treatment, harm reduction, and law enforcement (Wolf & Herzig,
2019). In 2017, Switzerland reported 500 new cases of HIV infection, which is a significant drop
from the 3,000 new cases reported in 1986 (Knopf, 2019). This decline in HIV transmission is
largely due to the success of these policies. In the Netherlands, a different method of drug control
is observed with law enforcement choosing to tolerate cannabis consumption despite its illegal
status (Anderson, 2012). Rather than decriminalizing all drugs, the Dutch government hoped to
separate the market for “soft” and “hard” drugs such as heroin and cocaine, and, as a result,
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informal cannabis dispensaries known as coffee shops began to emerge in the early 1980s (Van
Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, 2015). This has proven to be effective in combating the opioid
epidemic as the Netherlands reported a 21% reduction in problematic opiate users between 2009
and 2013 (Chatwin, 2016).
In 2016, 11.8 million Americans abused heroin or prescription opioids with a reported 2.4
million suffering from opioid-use disorders (Pearl, 2018). Pearl (2018) states, “Between 2014
and 2016, opioid overdose deaths increased by approximately 48 percent nationwide. Though
whites have the highest rates of fatal opioid overdoses, fatalities are on the rise among
communities of color. During the same period, opioid deaths rose by nearly 53 percent among
Latinos and 84 percent among blacks” (p. 3). These statistics highlight the impact that the opioid
epidemic has had on American society and the failure of the War on Drugs to protect American
citizens. In 2014, drug war policies had been in effect for several decades yet the number of
overdose fatalities and drug-related convictions continued to rise as seen in the aforementioned
statistic. It is evident that War on Drugs policies have been ineffective on both the national and
global scale; however, the United States continues to employ police and military intervention as
its main line of attack against drug use and trafficking. As 80 percent of opioids produced
globally are consumed by Americans, it stands to say that America’s greatest defense against
drug trafficking would be treating addiction at home rather than targeting suppliers in Colombia,
Mexico, and Afghanistan (Pearl, 2018).
Previous literature on this topic highlights individual issues related to War on Drugs
policies such as the prison-industrial complex, racial inequality, and addiction; however, the goal
of this project is to compile existing research in order to provide an overarching critique of drug
war policies on both a domestic and international scale while highlighting the effectiveness of
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alternatives to prohibition. Using existing research, I will address how these policies have
negatively impacted crime rates and health and public safety in the United States of America,
Colombia, Mexico, and Afghanistan. In comparison, the results of decriminalization in countries
such as Portugal, the Netherlands, and Switzerland will be discussed. The purpose of this paper
is to serve as a counter-argument to proponents of the War on Drugs who argue that these
policies protect citizens from drug crimes and addiction through providing statistical evidence
that reveals much more malicious effects. Over the course of this paper, I will address how the
United States’ “War on Drugs” policies effectively diminish public health and safety, imprison
minorities, and increase military influence on the global scale while providing realistic
alternatives to drug prohibition.
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Literature Review
While billions of dollars have been allocated to drug enforcement, this funding has done
little to improve rates of opioid overdose, disease transmission, and crime. Rather than
improving the health and safety of communities, the War on Drugs exacerbates the mental health
of people who suffer from addiction and perpetuates systemic racism. Despite these failures, the
War on Drugs successfully serves as a tool to exert and maintain American military control in
countries such as Colombia, Mexico, and Afghanistan.
Cost Analysis
The United States reported a drug control budget of approximately $25.5 billion in 2015
(Cooper, 2018). This same year, state governments allocated an additional $7 billion to imprison
drug offenders (Pearl, 2018). One example is the state of Georgia which spent 1.6 times more
incarcerating people of color for drug offenses in 2015 than they spent on substance abuse
treatment, reporting an estimated $78.6 million allocated to fund incarceration. This level of state
funding is not uncommon, however, as this same year, North Carolina spent more than $70
million to jail offenders for drug possession (Pearl, 2018). However, this magnitude of drug
control spending is not exclusive to 2015. Coyne and Hall (2017) estimate that in the 40 years
following the start of the War on Drugs, the United States spent more than $1 trillion on drug
prohibition —costing taxpayers upwards of $51 billion yearly. Despite this expenditure, the
opioid epidemic continues to cost the United States $504 billion annually (Pearl, 2018).
As highlighted by drug control spending in Georgia, states often allocate more money to
incarceration than treatment. An analysis completed by Caulkins in 1997 found that drug
treatment was more cost-effective than prohibition policies (Caulkins as cited in Donohue,
2012). For every $1 million spent on substance abuse treatment, Caulkins estimated that the
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average consumption of cocaine would decrease by 103.6 kg. On the other hand, $1 million
spent on pursuing longer sentences, decreased consumption by a mere 12.6 kg (Caulkins as cited
in Donohue, 2012). In addition to treatment, research has been done on the impact of supervised
injection facilities. One study conducted in New York City found that the introduction of these
facilities would reduce health care costs by $7 million annually (Pearl, 2018). Despite the cost
benefit associated with enacting these policies, the United States continues to fund prohibition
efforts that increase rates of overdose, disease transmission, and crime.
Human Collateral and the Myth of Public Safety
Growing Rates of Opioid Overdose
Since 1971, there has been an increase in the amount of overdose deaths reported by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. By 2014, this number rose from approximately 1
death per 100,000 people to 14.7 deaths per 100,000 people (Coyne & Hall, 2017).
Unfortunately, these numbers did not stagnate as deaths caused by opioid overdose increased by
about 48 percent nationally between 2014 and 2016 (Pearl, 2018). This information is startling
when you consider that prior to this increase 61 percent of all overdose deaths in 2014 were
linked to opioids (Coyne & Hall, 2017). To put this into perspective, in 2016, an American died
from opioid overdose every 16 minutes. This large number can be explained by the role
American citizens play in the global opioid market. Americans consume 80 percent of opioids
produced on the international market despite making up less than 5 percent of the global
population (Pearl, 2018). In fact, 2.4 million American adults suffer from a documented opioiduse disorder (Pearl, 2018).
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Worsening Mental Illness and Addiction Related to Incarceration
According to a report by Grecco and Chambers (2019), there is a biological causal
connection between addiction and mental illness. Over the past few decades, population
sampling studies have found a 2-8-fold increase in substance abuse disorders among people with
mental illness. This phenomenon is largely caused by abnormal neural circuits associated with
mental illness which affect the threshold for addiction and, in turn, increase both the severity and
rate of disease progression (Grecco & Chambers, 2019). People who suffer from mental illness
and addiction are around 7.5 times more likely to be incarcerated than healthy individuals. Once
incarcerated, mentally ill inmates are more likely to be subjected to behavioral intervention
strategies such as solitary confinement, which are known to amplify the behaviors and brain
abnormalities associated with mental illness. In addition to psychological harm, mentally ill
inmates are more likely to endure physical victimization. These factors could contribute to the
higher rates of suicide seen within the mentally ill prison population (Grecco & Chambers,
2019). The way the prison-industrial complex fails to combat drug use is best summarized by the
following statement:
A cast on a broken arm, insulin for diabetes, and opioid maintenance treatments
for opioid addiction are all evidence-based and highly effective Harm-Reduction
interventions. Oppositely, the core strategy of the War on Drugs, through
punishing drug use and closely related behavior, represents Harm Amplification,
where various primary and secondary damages associated with having the
disease are deliberately compounded by the criminal justice system (e.g. via
public humiliation, financial penalties, and incarceration), in hopes that this will
motivate effort in the individual to abandon their addiction. (Grecco & Chambers,
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2019, p. 7)
While the goal of imprisonment may be to discourage addiction, this is far from reality. In fact,
following their release, individuals who were incarcerated are 129 percent more likely to die
from an overdose than the rest of the population (Pearl, 2018).
The Impact of Prohibition on Overdose, Disease Transmission, and Crime Rates
Overdose. Outside of imprisonment, the prosecution of illegal drugs is thought to
contribute to an increase in overdoses due to the secretive nature of the black market. Once drugs
are on the black market, there is little information provided about their origin or quality (Coyne
& Hall, 2017). Additionally, there is no incentive for consumers to report impure substances as
they lack legal protections and fear implicating themselves in criminal activity. Because of this,
the market continues to churn out tainted products that are more likely to cause poisoning and
overdose (Coyne & Hall, 2017). On the other hand, because of the risk associated with black
market transactions, consumers are more likely to seek out products and ingestion methods with
higher potency. In turn, this change in product potency and consumption is thought to increase
the likelihood of overdose (Coyne & Hall, 2017). The criminalization of addiction not only
contributes to factors that increase overdose, but disease transmission as well.
Disease Transmission. Police presence plays a significant role in the spread of diseases
among drug users. A study conducted by Thomas Kerr in 2005 found that fear of police
intervention leads many intravenous drug users to rush injection, increasing their risk of infection
and vascular damage (Alexandris Polomarkakis, 2017). Furthermore, a study conducted in San
Francisco found that legal repercussions faced by both volunteers and clients of a needle
exchange program deterred prospective clients from using the program, which, in turn, increased
the likelihood that they would engage in unsafe practices (Bluthenthal et al., as cited in
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Alexandris Polomarkakis, 2017). Without access to syringe exchange programs many people
suffering from addiction opt to reuse or share needles as the syringe market is limited to
individuals with prescriptions in several states (Coyne & Hall, 2017). In addition to limiting
access to syringe access programs, a data analysis found that cases of HIV among drug users
were positively correlated with heightened police presence (Friedman et al. as cited in
Alexandris Polomarkakis, 2017). Disease transmission is a dire public health issue. This
seriousness of this issue is highlighted by a 2012 report that estimated 91,000 Americans were
living with HIV/AIDS due to intravenous drug use (Coyne & Hall, 2017). Similarly, drug users
are at an increased risk of contracting hepatitis C and hepatitis B, accounting for 60% of all new
hepatitis C cases and 17% of hepatitis B cases in 2000 (Coyne & Hall, 2017).
Effective Alternatives to Prohibition. This is not a hopeless cause, however, as syringe
access programs and supervised injection facilities have been shown to reduce both disease
transmission and cases of overdose. A study conducted in Washington state found that after
syringe access programs were introduced, the rate of new hepatitis B and hepatitis C cases fell by
80 percent (Pearl, 2018). A similar result was observed in Washington D.C. where syringe access
programs were linked to a significant decrease in new HIV infections. Over the course of two
years, the rate of new infections in the Washington D.C. area fell by 70 percent (Pearl, 2018). In
Vancouver, British Columbia, overdose fatalities were reduced by 35 percent in the two years
following the opening of a safe injection site. The year after the site opened, Vancouver reported
a 30 percent increase in the number of safe injection site patients that sought out treatment
(Pearl, 2018).
Crime Rates. Prohibition policies not only fail to reduce rates of overdose and disease
transmission but crime rates as well. Several studies conducted in the 1990s noted a positive
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correlation between drug enforcement and violent crime (Coyne & Hall, 2017). Subsequently,
the International Centre for Science in Drug Policy coordinated a literature review on the
relationship between violence and drug prohibition, finding a significant relationship between
prohibition and increased crime (Coyne & Hall, 2017). These findings are supported by a study
conducted in New York City which found that 40 percent of homicides were committed due to
the pressures of the drug market, while an additional 7.5 percent of homicides were attributed to
the physical effects of drug use (Coyne & Hall, 2017). Prohibition has not only led to an increase
in drug-related violence but has increased competition between traffickers.
An Evolving Market. Alexandris Polomarkakis (2017) argues that due to fear of
detection, traffickers keep smaller amounts of drugs on hand. Unfortunately, this does not
diminish drug trafficking, but rather increases the number of traffickers in the market
(Alexandris Polomarkakis, 2017). Because suppliers are only able to keep a small quantity on
hand, they are more likely to sell drugs with a higher value per unit and higher potency (Coyne
& Hall, 2017). Coyne and Hall (2017) illustrate the importance of value per unit by comparing
the prices of a gram of cannabis and a gram of heroin. While a gram of cannabis is typically
priced between $10 and $16, a gram of heroin sells for $450 on average (Coyne & Hall, 2017).
Despite this, a dealer could increase the expected value per unit of cannabis by choosing a strain
with a higher tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) concentration. This idea has led to an increase in the
amount of potent drugs available on the market (Coyne & Hall, 2017). Between 1990 and 2007,
there was a noted increase in the potency of drugs with a 60 percent increase in the potency of
heroin, an 11 percent increase in the potency of cocaine, and a 161 percent increase in the
potency of cannabis (Aponte & Hurrle, 2018).
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Punishing the Cause and Not the Source. While traffickers have adopted new strategies
for remaining undetected, drug users are not as lucky. Americans are arrested for drug possession
every 25 seconds (Pearl, 2018). An analysis of 700,000 drug arrests from 2004, 2008, and 2012
found that 40 percent of possession arrests are for 0.25 grams or less, while 20 percent of
possession arrests fell between 0.25 and one grams (Stellin, 2019). To illustrate these quantities,
Stellin (2019) notes that a Splenda packet weighs one gram. In 2015 alone, there were 1.3
million arrests for drug possession, outnumbering arrests for drug sales six times (Pearl, 2018).
This number only continues to rise, with possession accounting for 86 percent of all drug arrests
in 2018 compared with 67 percent in 1989 (Stellin, 2019). Today, there are more people serving
time for drug-related offenses than were incarcerated for any crime in 1980 (“Criminal Justice
Facts,” 2020). This system of mass incarceration has been detrimental to the black community.
Systematic Racism in Drug Convictions
Modern Slavery for Black Americans
In 2009, black people were sent to state prisons for drug offenses at a rate ten times
greater than their white counterparts with 256.2 out of 100,000 black adults being sent to prison
compared to 25.3 out of 100,000 white adults (Fellner, 2009). Black Americans are 3.73 times
more likely to be arrested for cannabis related offenses despite black and white Americans using
cannabis at similar rates (Ahrens, 2020). While a higher percentage of black adults reported
selling drugs than white adults in 2006, 2.8 percent and 1.6 percent respectively, the sheer
number of white sellers far outnumbers the number of black sellers (Fellner, 2009). In 2006,
there were an estimated 2,461,797 white sellers compared with 712,044 black sellers, meaning
black sellers accounted for only 14% of the combined amount (Fellner, 2009). This highlights
the shocking fact that almost half of all inmates serving a sentence greater than one year for drug
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crimes are black (Carson and Sabol as cited in Rosenberg et al., 2017). In fact, black adults
convicted of drug crimes are likely to serve about the same sentence (58.7 months) as white
adults convicted of violent crimes (61.7 months) (Pearl, 2018).
In 2001, the number of black men imprisoned in the United States exceeded the number
of black men who were enslaved in 1820 (Boyd, 2001). This incarceration rate is four times
greater than that of black men during the apartheid in South Africa (Boyd, 2001). In New York
City, black people accounted for 10.7% of the state population in 2002; however, they
compromised 42.1% of drug-related arrests that same year (Fellner, 2009). Similarly, in 2005,
Massachusetts reported that 1.6 percent of their entire black population was incarcerated,
indicating incarceration rates were seven times higher for black citizens than white citizens
(Western, 2018). Nationally, in 2009, black people accounted for 38% of state and federal prison
inmates despite making up only 13% of the total US population (Nicosia et al., 2013).
In addition to inequality in the number of convictions for black Americans, there is
evidence that black Americans are more likely to be convicted of drug crimes that they did not
commit. Gross, Possley, & Stevens analyzed 221 drug crime exonerations and found that 55% of
defendants in cases of wrongful conviction were black (2017). This means that black Americans
are twelve times more likely to be wrongly accused and sentenced than white Americans (Gross
et al., 2017). One of the most shocking instances of this occurred in Tulia, Texas between 1999
and 2000 (Gross et al., 2017). Tom Coleman, an undercover narcotics officer, testified that 39
defendants were guilty of trafficking cocaine in Tulia (Gross et al., 2017). The majority of these
defendants were black and were convicted on Coleman’s word alone (Gross et al., 2017). In
2003, a judge found that these convictions were the result of perjury and that the drugs presented
as evidence in these trials were taken from Coleman’s personal supply (Gross et al., 2017). That
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same year, 35 of these cases were pardoned by Texas governor, Rick Perry (Gross et al., 2017).
Unfortunately, this is not an isolated incident. Bradley Bridge, a public defender, states that “at
least 95%” of Philadelphia’s 1,000 or more exoneration cases involved people of color (Gross et
al., 2017). One of Philadelpia’s most heinous cases of perjury involves police officer Jeffrey
Walker, who is linked to hundreds of wrongful convictions across the span of a decade (Gross et
al. 2017). One of Walker’s victims, Kareem Torain, served 13 years in prison before he was
exonerated in February 2014 (Gross et al., 2017). Wrongful convictions for minority Americans,
such as those perpetuated in the cases of Tom Coleman and Jeffrey Walker, are seen in the
majority of legal jurisdictions across the United States (Gross et al., 2017). The negative impact
convictions have on innocent civilians is undeniable, and no settlement can account for years lost
in the criminal justice system. While the following studies do not address exoneration rates, it is
important to consider that this may be a factor in rates of minority arrests that are presented.
As a member of the United Nations, the United States ratified the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) (Fellner, 2009).
ICERD indicates that countries must "review governmental, national and local policies, and . . .
amend, rescind or nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or
perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists” (Fellner, 2009, p. 258). However, the
United States ratified this treaty under the stipulation that they would not be required to change
any existing laws (Fellner, 2009). The impact systemic racism and prejudice have on drug
convictions is widespread and is highlighted in several case studies across America, including
studies in the state of California; Seattle, Washington; and New Haven, Connecticut.
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Case Studies
California. A study analyzing drug-related offenses from 1995 to 2005 in California’s
Automated Criminal History System found that black men were arrested approximately twice as
often as white men (Nicosia et al., 2013). In turn, black men were two times more likely to
receive a prison sentence (Nicosia et al., 2013). Nicosia, Macdonald, and Arkes (2013) state that
the disparity seen in prison sentences is no longer statistically significant after factoring for
criminal history; however, they found that black men were statistically more likely to have a
previous conviction. Between 1980 and 2003, drug arrests for black Americans increased at three
times the rate of white arrests (225% vs 70%) (Fellner, 2009). This difference was even more
apparent in eleven cities where the number of black arrests increased by more than 500%
(Fellner, 2009). Therefore, because black people have historically been arrested and convicted at
higher rates than white people, this disparity should be considered significant regardless of
criminal history.
Seattle, Washington. In Seattle, Washington, disproportionate rates of black arrests are
thought to be the result of policing outdoor markets and emphasizing crack over other illicit
substances. (Fellner, 2009). This disparate focus on crack can be traced back to The Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, which mandated a minimum prison sentence of five years for people in
possession of any amount of crack cocaine (Cooper, 2018). In order to receive the same sentence
for powdered cocaine as crack cocaine, you would need to possess 100 times the amount of
crack cocaine required (Cooper, 2018). In Seattle, white people constitute the majority of
methamphetamine, ecstasy, powder cocaine, and heroin dealers, while black people make up the
majority of crack dealers (Fellner, 2009). Despite this, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration found that 5,553,000 white people reported using crack cocaine
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compared with 1,537,000 black people (Fellner, 2009). This negates the idea that crack is
favored by the black community at higher rates. While white people make up the majority of
crack users nationally, black people account for 79 percent of crack related arrests in Seattle
(Fellner, 2009). In fact, three-fourths of drug arrests in Seattle were crack-related despite
accounting for one-third of the city’s drug transactions (Fellner, 2009). Researchers attempted to
find an explanation for Seattle law enforcement’s emphasis on crack offenders; however,
researchers could not find evidence to support higher rates of crack transactions, greater public
health concerns, or citizen complaints (Fellner, 2009). Unsurprisingly, around two-thirds
(64.2%) of people arrested for drug offenses in Seattle are black despite white people accounting
for the majority of Seattle residents that shared, sold, or transferred illicit drugs (Fellner, 2009).
New Haven, Connecticut. In New Haven, Connecticut, black people were convicted of
drug sales at a rate 8.24 times greater than white people even after adjusting for
sociodemographic factors such as gender, education, and history of homelessness (Rosenberg et
al., 2017). Despite this, researchers did not find significant statistical differences in the number
of black people and white people who reported ever selling drugs (Rosenberg et al., 2017).
Additionally, they found black people were charged with possession 2.2 times more than white
people in New Haven despite both groups reporting similar rates of drug use (Rosenberg et al.,
2017). Once charged, black people in New Haven are more likely to be incarcerated and endure
longer sentences than white people with black inmates serving 1.74 years for every .71 years
served by white inmates (Rosenberg et al., 2017). In addition to being convicted for drug sales
and possession at higher rates, black men in New Haven are more likely to be unemployed than
white men (25% vs 12%) and black families are more likely to report a lower average income
than white families ($37,547 vs $77,443) (Rawlings as cited in Rosenberg et al., 2017). After
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incarceration, black people are more likely to be excluded from financial aid, housing benefits,
and job opportunities (Drucker as cited in Rosenberg et al., 2017). These factors are thought to
contribute to poverty in the black community and, in turn, lead black people to participate in
drug trade due to a lack of available employment opportunities (Rosenberg et al., 2017).
The American War on Drugs is not only a domestic human rights issue but an
international one. By analyzing both the cost-effectiveness of these policies and the impact that
they have on crime rates and public safety, the detrimental effects of the War on Drugs become
irrefutable. To assess the damage these policies have done abroad, these factors will be analyzed
in the countries of Colombia, Mexico, and Afghanistan.
The War on Drugs as a Tool of American Militarism
Colombia
In 1999, the Colombian government partnered with the United States in order to reduce
the production and trafficking of cocaine and regain jurisdiction over areas controlled by armed
militias (Mejía, 2016). After the Cold War ended in 1991, American military officials feared
budget cuts, and scholars argue that this partnership provided a logical solution (Lee, 2017).
Additionally, the United States hoped to maintain American interests, such as access to the
Panama Canal and oil in South America, by suppressing guerrilla uprisings in Colombia (Lee,
2017). While these intentions have only been speculated, the United States publicly stated that
the goal of Plan Colombia was to “reduce the cultivation, processing, and distribution of cocaine
in Colombia by 50 percent in six years” (Guardiola-Rivera & Koram, 2019, p. 130). Between
2000 and 2008, the United States spent an average of $540 million per year funding military
operations related to Plan Colombia (Mejía, 2016). Despite this, the cultivation and production of
cocaine did not decrease between 2000-2006 but rather increased with cultivation rates rising by
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15% and production rates rising by 4% (Guardiola-Rivera & Koram, 2019). As of 2016,
Colombia continued to maintain its spot as the world’s largest cocaine producer (Mejía, 2016).
While prohibition policies have had little impact on cocaine production, they have had a
substantial impact on quality of life for Colombian citizens. One such example is the long-term
environmental and physical impacts of aerial fumigation. Aerial fumigation was one of the core
strategies used to reduce cocaine production employed under Plan Colombia (Mejía, 2016). This
practice is detrimental to the environment, and several studies have linked aerial spraying with
harming amphibian populations, water pollution, and deforestation (Mejía, 2016). It is estimated
that 1 million hectares of Colombian forests were destroyed due to the practices of aerial
spraying and crop eradication (Guardiola-Rivera & Koram, 2019). Additionally, one of the
primary herbicides used in aerial fumigation, glyphosate, is linked to health problems ranging
from skin conditions to miscarriages (Mejía, 2016).
Increased violence poses an even greater threat to Colombian citizens than the effects of
aerial fumigation. The Colombian National Centre of Historical Memory estimates that 220,000
Colombians have died or gone missing due to War on Drugs and counterinsurgency efforts;
however, some scholars believe that these estimates are conservative (Guardiola-Rivera &
Koram, 2019). One report estimates that more than 57,000 Colombians were killed due to drugrelated violence between 1994 and 2008 alone (Mejía, 2016). Despite evidence tracing these acts
of violence to several well-known paramilitary leaders, victims rarely see justice for these crimes
as these leaders are often extradited to the United States, where they face minimal sentencing. In
fact, paramilitary members average less time in American prisons than inmates convicted of
trafficking less than an ounce of crack cocaine, serving seven and a half and 12 years
respectively (Sontag, 2016). The case of Salvatore Manusco serves as one example of the unjust
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sentencing of paramilitary leaders. In Colombia, Manusco was charged with the disappearance of
over 1,000 people; however, the United States District Court sentenced him to a mere 15 years
and 10 months due to his cooperation (Sontag, 2016). Prosecutors in Manusco’s case have
described him as a “gentleman” and it is anticipated that he will serve a little more than 12 years
of his sentence (Sontag, 2016). Typically, paramilitary members face additional sentences once
they return to Colombia; however, the United States has granted two members, Juan Carlos
Sierra and Carlos Mario Aguilar, safe haven for both themselves and their families (Sontag,
2016). While drug traffickers do not qualify for asylum, the United States has sanctioned their
stay under the Convention Against Torture (Sontag, 2016). In 2016, there were three additional
paramilitary members seeking asylum under this convention (Sontag, 2016).
The average Colombian citizen is not afforded the same opportunities as these
paramilitary members. Many impoverished farmers were forced into cocaine production due to
their inability to compete with the prices of subsidized American crops (Guardiola-Rivera &
Koram, 2019). Despite promising a portion of Plan Colombia’s funds would go towards the
development of social programs, 80 percent of funds were allocated to the Colombian military
(Guardiola-Rivera & Koram, 2019). The Colombian government has invested in programs such
as coca crop substitution to promote alternative livelihoods to coca farming; however, most of
these programs are unsuccessful as they only provide limited training and monetary incentives
instead of resources that promote self-sustainable farming (Mejía, 2016). Despite failed
alternative livelihood programs, the Plan de Consolidación Integral de la Macarena was shown to
successfully boost the economy, increase school enrollment, improve public health, and reduce
homicides (Mejía, 2016). The program’s success was largely attributed to the numerous issues it
addressed, including justice reform and police presence (Mejía, 2016). Despite the success of the
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Plan de Consolidación Integral de la Macarena’s success, the Colombian government
discontinued the plan’s expansion (Mejía, 2016). However, in 2013, the Colombian government
opted to decriminalize methamphetamine and ecstasy, adding these drugs to a list that includes
marijuana and cocaine (Isacson et al., 2013 as cited in Bartilow, 2019).
Mexico
The Colombian drug trade is directly tied to drug operations in Mexico. The partnership
between Colombian drug traffickers and Mexican cartels began as a way to ensure Colombian
drugs would not be seized when they passed through the Caribbean and Florida, with the U.S.Mexico border providing better entry (Mercille, 2011). It is estimated that 50% of all South
American cocaine entered through this border in 2001 (Finckenauer et al., 2001 as cited in
Brouwer et al., 2006). In 2008, the United States launched the Mérida Initiative, a program
designed to train and equip Mexican military and police forces to squash drug operations
(Mercille, 2011). Since it was first enacted, the initiative has delivered more than $1.5 billion to
Mexico (Mercille, 2011). However, despite extensive funding, drug production continued to
grow. Most notably, opium production increased from 71 tons in 2005 to 425 tons in 2009
(Mercille, 2011). During this same period, cannabis production grew from 5,600 hectares to
17,500 hectares (Mercille, 2011). In 2010, the US State department announced a new initiative,
the “Beyond Mérida” strategy (Mercille, 2011). This strategy involved providing the Mexican
government with 26 armored vehicles, seven Bell helicopters, and three UH-60 helicopters
(Mercille, 2011). While these helicopters are valued at $88 million and $76.5 million
respectively, they are purchased from US arms manufacturers and as Mercille (2011) explains
they can be “seen as a gift to the US arms industry” (p. 1645). Despite the failure of these
policies to suppress drug production and trafficking, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
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has noted forming a working military relationship with Mexico as one of the successes of the
Mexican War on Drugs (Mercille, 2011). Notable analysts believe that this was the intention of
the drug war from the beginning (Mercille, 2011).
While the Mérida Initiative furthered the scope of the United States military, the Mexican
public suffered at the hands of drug-trafficking groups. As Durán-Martínez (2015) noted,
“Homicide rates increased from 8.5 percent in 2007 to 13.5 percent in 2008, and by 2011 they
had reached 24.22 percent” (p. 136). These figures are even more shocking when they are
isolated to cities with a large cartel presence. For example, Ciudad Juarez experienced over a 700
percent increase in homicides between 2007 and 2008 alone (Durán-Martínez, 2015). These
increases were not unique to Ciudad Juarez as Tijuana and Culiacan also experienced notable
increases in violence with homicide rates increasing that same year by 259 and 205 percent
respectively (Durán-Martínez, 2015). Between 2007 and 2010, the number of municipalities with
at least 12 deaths related to organized crime rose from 53 to 200, marking an increase of 277%
(Guerrero Gutiérrez, 2012).
Violence is not the only issue perpetuated by drug cartels as areas they occupy experience
increases in drug use and addiction. In 1998, Tijuana reported the highest rate of illicit drug
consumption in the country, with approximately 14.7% of adults aged 12-65 reporting drug use
in their lifetimes (SSA, 1998 as cited in Brouwer et al., 2006). This rate equals three times the
national average, 5.3% (SSA, 1998 as cited in Brouwer et al., 2006). Similarly, Ciudad Juarez
reported higher rates of drug use, approximately 9.2% (SSA, 1998 as cited in Brouwer et al.,
2006). While surges in drug use are most notable in areas with cartel influence, Mexico
experienced a nationwide surge in drug use between 1988 and 1998, with the percentage of
Mexicans in urban areas reporting drug use increasing from 3.3% to 5.5% and reported cocaine

22
use rising from 0.33% to 1.5%. (SSA, 1998 as cited in Brouwer et al., 2006). As of 2002, 38%
of all patients enrolled in government-run drug treatment centers were seeking help for cocaine
abuse, while composing 19% of patients in non-government-controlled centers (SSA, 2002 as
cited in Brouwer et al., 2006). Several studies have linked increased cocaine consumption along
the U.S.-Mexico border to strict border control measures that were enacted following the events
of September 11, 2001 (Medina-Mora and Rojas Guiot, 2003 as cited in Brouwer et al., 2006).
Because cartels found themselves with a surplus of cocaine that they were unable to move across
the border, they looked to Mexican citizens as clientele in order to unload their product
(UNODC, 2003 as cited in Brouwer et al., 2006). In addition to selling products to Mexican
citizens, there is evidence dating back to the 1980s that drug traffickers have been paying
workers along the border with drugs, increasing their availability in local markets (Meyer 2007,
as cited in Durán-Martínez, 2015). This is significant as approximately 450,000 Mexicans earn a
portion of their income from drug trafficking (Mercille, 2011).
Trafficking drugs is not the only job that exploits Mexican citizens. Many Mexican
farmers have turned to opium production due to the fall of corn and coffee prices (Bucardo et al.,
2005). While coffee garnishes an average profit of 15 cents a pound, a pound of opium gum can
result in a profit of $700 to $1200 USD (Lloyd, 2003 as cited in Bucardo et al., 2005). Many of
the farmers that did not switch to opium production were forced to relocate to cities along the
U.S. border, providing cheap labor to U.S. manufacturers (Mercille, 2011). These jobs have had
little impact on overall employment as the manufacturing industry has only added between
500,000-600,000 jobs (Mercille, 2011). These numbers may seem substantial; however, they do
little to address the 2.3 million agricultural jobs lost due to Mexican farmer’s inability to
compete with U.S subsidized crops (Mercille, 2011). As a result, in 2004, 57% of the Mexican
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workforce was made up of informal labor (Mercille, 2011). This type of employment often
exploits workers. The consequences of this can be seen in the city of Juárez where the average
wage dropped from $4.50 a day to $3.70 (Mercille, 2011).
Even though unemployment leads to increased participation in drug production and
trafficking, funding from the United States has done little to encourage crop substitution and
alternative livelihoods. The majority of $1.5 billion provided in aid between 2008 and 2011 was
allocated to military training and equipment (Mercille, 2011). Despite this, the Mexican
government has attempted to address the drug epidemic through legislation. In 2009, Mexico
decriminalized the possession of minute amounts of cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and
cannabis (Bartilow, 2019). However, this same year, Mexico continued to highlight incarceration
and penalization as primary actions against the drug crisis (Bartilow, 2019).
Afghanistan
After the Taliban was deposed in 2001, the United States directed their attention to opium
eradication (Coyne et al., 2016). In 2002, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
reported that Afghanistan was responsible for the production of more than 75 percent of the
world’s opium supply (Coyne et al., 2016). As opium production was a significant source of
revenue for terrorist organizations, the United States hoped to devastate any remaining terrorist
influence in Afghanistan (Coyne et al., 2016). In 2003, they implemented their first course of
action, opening 13 Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) offices in Afghanistan (Coyne et al.,
2016). The following year, the DEA reported a budget of $3.7 million (Coyne et al., 2016). This
influence only continued to increase with the DEA reporting a budget of $40.6 million in 2008
and 95 Afghanistan offices in 2013 (Coyne et al., 2016). However, much like Colombia and
Mexico, interdiction efforts did not significantly decrease opium production. In fact, in 2006,
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Afghanistan broke the record of opium production, cultivating a total of 165,000 hectares
(UNODC 2006, as cited in Coyne et al., 2016). This marked a 60 percent increase between 2005
and 2006 alone (UNODC 2006, as cited in Coyne et al., 2016). In 2009, a United States
representative, Richard Holbrooke, admitted that eradication efforts in Afghanistan were largely
unsuccessful, stating that “hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars” had been wasted
(Donadio as cited in Coyne et al., 2016, p. 102). As of 2016, the United States spent $8.4 billion
on drug war efforts in Afghanistan (Coyne et al., 2016). These efforts did not lead to decreased
opium production, but rather, increased violence (Glaze, 2007).
Between 2005 and 2006, the number of terrorist attacks against the Karzai government,
NATO, and U.S. troops increased from 1,558 to 4,542 (Glaze, 2007). Additionally, there was an
uptick in roadside bombings with numbers increasing from 783 to 1,677 (Glaze, 2007).
Likewise, suicide bombings increased five times, reaching 139 reported in 2006 (Glaze, 2007).
Unfortunately, the Taliban was not the only source of increased violence in the area. At the end
of 2006, the United States military was responsible for over 2,000 air strikes (Glaze, 2007).
These strikes could not specifically target insurgent forces and, as a result, hundreds of innocent
civilians lost their lives (Glaze, 2007). In 2006, President Karzai released a statement saying, “It
is not acceptable that in all this fighting, Afghans are dying. In the past 3 to 4 weeks, 500 to 600
Afghans were killed. Even if they are Taliban they are sons of this land” (Glaze, 2007, p. 10).
Violence is not the only issue plaguing the sons of Afghanistan. In 2007, the country of
Afghanistan was extremely impoverished, reporting an average per capita income of $800
(Glaze, 2007). During this period, about 80% of the rural population in Afghanistan lived in
poverty (Glaze, 2007). Even more shocking is that only 23% of the population had access to
clean drinking water at this time (Glaze, 2007). The U.N. Development Program reported that
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Afghanistan had some of the worst rates of nutrition, life expectancy, infant mortality, and
literacy in the world (Glaze, 2007). In order to make a livable wage, many farmers turned to
opium cultivation (Glaze, 2007).
While only 12 percent of land in Afghanistan is arable, 70 percent of Afghans rely on
agriculture as a primary source of income (Glaze, 2007). Traditional crops such as barley, corn,
cotton, grapes, fruit, nuts, and wheat suffered from drought and lack of infrastructure; therefore,
opium poppy provided a drought-resistant alternative (Glaze, 2007). Due to a lack of feasible
alternatives and pressures from warlords, opium poppy became the largest crop cultivated in
Afghanistan (Paul et al., 2014). This is unsurprising considering that a hectare of opium
garnishes $4,622 in profit whereas a hectare of wheat garnishes a mere $266 (Glaze, 2007).
Despite producing most of the world’s opium, Afghanistan is unable to enter the prescription
drug market as it is saturated by opium produced in India, Turkey, Spain, and Hungary (Glaze,
2007). Therefore, virtually all opium cultivated in Afghanistan is sold as heroin on the
international market (Glaze, 2007). In 2006, this production accounted for more than 35 percent
of their gross national product with Afghanistan reporting a revenue of over $3 billion; however,
only 20 percent of this profit went towards poverty-stricken farmers (Glaze, 2007). Most of this
revenue is used to pay opium traffickers and corrupt politicians (Glaze, 2007).
Government officials in Afghanistan are thought to play a role in at least 70 percent of all
opium trafficking (Glaze, 2007). Much like Afghan farmer’s involvement in opium production,
government officials in Afghanistan are largely motivated to participate in opium trafficking due
to poverty. While Afghan police chiefs are typically awarded a salary of $60 a month, they have
the potential to make $100,000 in bribes every six months in opium-producing areas (Goodhand,
2008). Positions in both the Afghan Border Police and the Ministry of Interior Affairs are often
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auctioned off for amounts in excess of “hundreds of thousands of dollars” (Paul et al., 2014, p.
215). Unsurprisingly, 25 percent of Afghanistan’s parliament and 13 current or former provincial
governors are thought to be intimately involved with opium trade (Glaze, 2007).
The United States shifted its focus from eradication to providing alternative livelihoods in
2009 (Coyne et al., 2016). They sought to implement crop-replacement programs and provide
economic assistance to “poppy-free provinces” (Embassy of the United States, 2014 as cited in
Coyne et al., 2016). However, despite these efforts, little headway has been made towards
reducing opium cultivation and trafficking. As Paul et al. (2014) state, “Afghanistan is what
might be termed a worst-case scenario or perfect storm of persistent conflict, narcotics trade,
state weakness, and extremely low levels of development” (p. 216). These factors partnered with
political corruption have allowed drug trade to continue to flourish.
Decriminalization as an Alternative to Prohibition
Drug policy in the United States has proven ineffective both domestically and abroad;
however, there is evidence to support decriminalization as an effective alternative. Several
European countries, such as Portugal, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, have addressed the drug
epidemic with plans that emphasize treatment rather than incarceration. After emphasizing
prevention, treatment, and harm reduction, all three countries saw significant declines in the
number of reported drug users, overdose deaths, and cases of disease transmission.
Portugal
Portugal became keenly aware of its opioid epidemic in the late 1980s (Domoslawski &
Siemaszko, 2011). The first action taken by the Portuguese government in response to this crisis
was the establishment of a TAIPAS treatment center in Lisbon (Domoslawski & Siemaszko,
2011). This response was backed by the public as, following the establishment of TAIPAS, a
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number of privately-owned drug rehabilitation centers were opened (Domoslawski & Siemaszko,
2011). However, due to public concerns about the legal consequences related to drug use, many
people suffering from addiction avoided treatment (Domoslawski & Siemaszko, 2011). As a
result, rates of drug use and new cases of HIV among heroin users steadily increased
(Domoslawski & Siemaszko, 2011). By 1997, Portugal reported that drug abuse was the number
one issue plaguing the country (Domoslawski & Siemaszko, 2011).
In response, the Portuguese government formed a committee of doctors, lawyers,
psychologists, sociologists, and social activists, known as the Commission for a National Drug
Strategy, to evaluate its drug control policy (Domoslawski & Siemaszko, 2011). In 1998, the
commission recommended a policy of harm reduction rather than punishment (Loo et al., 2002
as cited in Anderson, 2012). As a result, new laws were put in place in 2001 to decriminalize the
possession of up to what they determined to be a 10-day supply of any drug (Kristof, 2017). If
someone is found in possession of illicit substances, they are directed to a panel of experts to
determine if they are suffering from addiction (Anderson, 2012). Before this panel, known as the
Dissuasion Commission, offenders are encouraged to discuss their family history, relationship
with drug use, and work status (Domoslawski & Siemaszko, 2011). If they have previously been
brought before the commission, they are subject to administrative action, such as a verbal
warning, fine, or suspension of professional licenses (McCaffrey, 2010 as cited in Anderson,
2012). However, these actions can be avoided if the defendant submits to drug treatment
(Anderson, 2012). Likewise, if it is their first offense and they are not determined to show signs
of addiction, the hearing is dismissed (Anderson, 2012). In 2005, Portugal reported that 83% of
the 3,192 committee hearings were dismissed, while 2.5% of the hearings found that the
defendant was not guilty (McCaffrey, 2010 as cited in Anderson, 2012). If the defendant is
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dependent on drugs and refuses treatment, they are rarely sanctioned to do so, as the commission
wants them to seek treatment through their own volition (Domoslawski & Siemaszko, 2011).
Furthermore, Portuguese law prohibits fines on citizens with signs of addiction because they may
commit crimes in order to obtain the necessary funds (Domoslawski & Siemaszko, 2011). As a
result, Portuguese residents reported less fear attending meetings with the Dissuasion
Commission than attending court hearings prior to the implementation of decriminalization
(Domoslawski & Siemaszko, 2011).
In addition to changing government policies regarding drug use, many community
outreach and social service programs have been established. These outreach programs seek to
raise the understanding of and eliminate prejudice associated with addiction (Domoslawski &
Siemaszko, 2011). This involves teams speaking in residential areas, schools, and businesses in
communities where people are known to be battling addiction (Domoslawski & Siemaszko,
2011). In these same communities, street worker teams are tasked with providing kits containing
clean syringes and hygiene products, such as condoms, distilled water, and gauze, to drug users
(Domoslawski & Siemaszko, 2011). In an effort to curb the spread of blood borne diseases such
as HIV and hepatitis C, recipients are required to return syringes and needles before they are
given a new kit (Domoslawski & Siemaszko, 2011). Finally, in addition to providing methadone
therapy, psychotherapy, and physical therapy, TAIPAS has also expanded its role in
rehabilitation and now offers art and information technology courses (Domoslawski &
Siemaszko, 2011). TAIPAS hopes to help patients successfully reintegrate into society by
forming a reintegration team (Domoslawski & Siemaszko, 2011). These teams collaborate with
the patient in order to develop a plan to achieve their goals, such as returning to work or school,
while assisting them in their search job search (Domoslawski & Siemaszko, 2011).
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These policies have effectively achieved the goal of harm reduction. Since the
implementation of new policies in 2001, the Portuguese Health Ministry has reported a
significant decrease in the number of reported heroin users (Kristof, 2017). In 2017, it was
estimated that there were 25,000 heroin users in Portugal, compared with 100,000 in 2001
(Kristof, 2017). This is a significant drop because in 2001, Portugal reported the second highest
rate of citizens in Europe who had used heroin in their lifetime, 0.7% respectively (Domoslawski
& Siemaszko, 2011). In addition to high rates of drug use, in 1999, Portugal reported the highest
rate of AIDS transmission in drug users in all of the European Union; however, by 2017, the rate
of transmission among drug users had decreased by more than 90 percent (Kristof, 2017). As of
2017, Portugal reported the lowest drug mortality rate in Western Europe, approximately onefiftieth of the drug mortality rate reported in the United States (Kristof, 2017). Despite decreased
rates of drug use, the Portuguese government has confiscated larger quantities of drugs despite
making fewer arrests (Domoslawski & Siemaszko, 2011). Initially, the Portuguese police force
was concerned that decriminalization policies would encourage drug abuse, result in a loss of
drug informants, and decimate both their financial and human resources; however, today, the
Portuguese police officers report that these policies have allowed them to better combat
organized crime and drug trafficking (Domoslawski & Siemaszko, 2011).
The Netherlands
In 1976, the Netherlands determined that cannabis possession was not proven to cause
“substantial harm” and, as a result, should rank low on the priority list of law enforcement
(Anderson, 2012, p. 9). However, unlike Portugal, the possession of hard drugs, such as cocaine
and heroin, is still criminalized under the Opium Act of 1976 (Anderson, 2012). This
reprioritization of cannabis resulted in the emergence of coffee shops, a form of cannabis
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dispensary, in the early 1980s (Van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, 2015). By 1995, the
Netherlands estimated that there were 1,100-1,200 coffee shops in operation (Van OoyenHouben & Kleemans, 2015). Despite this, cannabis possession remains illegal in the
Netherlands; however, it is only considered to be an “offense against order” and rarely results in
legal action (Anderson, 2012, p. 9). By tolerating coffee shop operations, the Dutch government
hoped to encourage the separation of the market for soft and hard drugs (Van Ooyen-Houben &
Kleemans, 2015). However, the increasing number of coffee shops in 1995 created concern
among Dutch policy makers and led to the implementation of new regulations limiting the
amount of cannabis that could be held in stock and purchased by consumers, prohibiting the sale
of alcohol on coffee shop premises, and restricting purchase to people over the age of 18
(Staatscourant, 1996 as cited in Van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, 2015). By 2011, these
restrictions had expanded, limiting the advertising of coffee shops, requiring coffee shops to
operate as private clubs limited to residents by 2012, and prohibiting coffee shops from operating
within 350 meters of secondary schools by 2013 (Staatscourant; Tweede Kamer as cited in Van
Ooyen-Houben, 2015).
Despite government concerns, there is evidence to support that the implementation of
coffee shops helped to deter citizens from using hard drugs. In 2013, the Netherlands reported a
total of 14,000 problematic opiate users (Chatwin, 2016). This figure is 21 percent lower than
estimates reported in 2009 (Chatwin, 2016). By 2016, the Netherlands reported the lowest rate of
injecting drug users among all European countries, with only 7% of heroin users reporting recent
drug injections (Chatwin, 2016). Additionally, the Netherlands has seen a decline in the number
of 12-18-year-olds that report using cannabis. In 1996, the Netherlands reported that 11 percent
of 12-18-year-olds that were surveyed had used cannabis in the last month; however, in both
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2007 and 2011, this fell to 8 percent of those surveyed (Van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, 2015).
Studies have suggested that because the majority of cannabis users acquire product through
coffee shops rather than illegal means, the implementation of coffee shops has successfully
separated the market (Van Laar et al., 2009 as cited in Van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, 2015).
In fact, studies have shown that the soft and hard drug markets in the Netherlands are more
fragmented compared to other regions in Europe and the United States (Van Ooyen-Houben &
Kleemans, 2015). However, after requiring private club status for coffee shops, the Netherlands
saw an increase in cannabis-related black-market transactions (Van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans,
2015). In November 2012, the Dutch government responded by nullifying two previous
restrictions, namely restrictions requiring coffee shops to operate as private clubs and prohibiting
coffee shops from being within 350 feet of secondary schools (Van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans,
2015). After this policy change, the illegal market has decreased; however, it is still bigger than
before (Van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, 2015).
Switzerland
In the 1970s, although Zurich was one of the wealthiest cities in the world, it was known
for its rampant drug use (Wolf & Herzig, 2019). In response, the Swiss government imposed
stricter penalties for the possession and sale of illegal drugs (Wolf & Herzig, 2019).
Nevertheless, by 1986, Switzerland reported the highest rate of new HIV infections in Western
Europe (Wolf & Herzig, 2019). In response, nonprofits and public agencies took it upon
themselves to establish programs such as needle-exchange programs and supervised injection
facilities (Wolf & Herzig, 2019). While authorities did not seek to dismantle these programs,
doctors providing patients with clean syringes were threatened with legal action (Wolf & Herzig,
2019). However, despite this initial push back, medical professionals, social workers, churches,
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and law enforcement eventually came together in an effort to help those suffering from addiction
(Wolf & Herzig, 2019). Coalitions were formed, and city representatives and healthcare
authorities alike began to advocate for harm reduction policies such as needle exchange
programs (Wolf & Herzig, 2019). Over time, the success of these programs led to increased
support from government officials, who in turn allocated funds to support drug reform efforts
(Wolf & Herzig, 2019). Between 1991 and 1999, the Swiss government allocated about 15
million Swiss francs to the Federal Office of Public Health, which helped create more than 300
programs (Wolf & Herzig, 2019). One such example is the Heroin Assisted Treatment trials,
which analyzed the effectiveness of the prescription of heroin to drug users in Bern, Basel,
Geneva, and Zurich (Wolf & Herzig, 2019). Finally, in 1997, Switzerland founded a committee
of 14 academic experts well-versed in the area of narcotic drugs known as the Federal
Commission of Drug Issues (Wolf & Herzig, 2019). The Swiss approach to drug reform became
known as the “four-pillar model” as it emphasized prevention, treatment, harm reduction, and
law enforcement (Wolf & Herzig, 2019). Despite some opposition, this model received strong
public support as 70% of Swiss citizens voted to uphold these policies in 1997 (Knopf, 2019). It
is important to note that while this model has been in place since the 1990s, Switzerland did not
make amendments to their narcotic law until 2008 after significant progress had already been
made (Wolf & Herzig, 2019).
The four-pillar model has successfully reduced disease transmission. Although
Switzerland reported the highest HIV transmission rate in Western Europe in 1986, fewer than
500 new cases were reported in Switzerland by 2017, compared with 3,000 in 1986 (Knopf,
2019). Likewise, despite seeing a spike in new Hepatitis C cases in 1999 and 2002, rates have
since declined (Knopf, 2019). In addition, since the implementation of the four-pillar model, the
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price and purity of heroin seized by the Swiss police have fallen sharply, and analysis estimates
that the purity is between 15% and 20% (Knopf, 2019). As mentioned earlier, this may have a
significant impact on the rate of drug overdose. It is believed that the use of illegal substances
with higher potency will increase the incidence of drug overdose (Coyne & Hall, 2017). On the
other hand, due to accessible drug testing, Switzerland does not struggle with cases of accidental
fentanyl overdose like the United States as consumers can easily receive laboratory reports of
what is in their product (Knopf, 2019). Perhaps most shocking, Switzerland saw a 98 percent
reduction in the number of reported theft cases (Knopf, 2019). In addition to reducing theft, the
number of prosecutions involving opioid-related crimes has dropped from 20,000 in 1993 to an
average of 5,000 in 2019 (Knopf, 2019).
Thilo Beck, medical director of Zurich’s heroin-assisted treatment program, contributes
the program's success to the accessibility of treatment provided by Switzerland’s universal
healthcare system (Knopf, 2019). In addition to universal healthcare, the program is accessible as
it creates realistic goals for people suffering from substance-abuse disorder (Knopf, 2019). For
example, patients can receive methadone or buprenorphine for drug-assisted treatment,
regardless of whether they have used street drugs recently, because patients do not need to be
screened for drugs before receiving treatment (Knopf, 2019). This allows patients to receive
treatment within 20 minutes of entering the clinic (Knopf, 2019). Additionally, Swiss drug
analyst, Christian Schneider, stated that the availability of drug alternatives competes with the
illicit drug market (Knopf, 2019). Schneider highlighted this phenomenon in the following
statement: “By offering substitution therapy almost unconditionally to virtually anyone willing to
change their consumption from heroin to another product, the health care system became a viable
competitor among those supplying people addicted to opioids in Switzerland (Knopf, 2019, para.
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42). This sentiment was echoed by harm reduction expert Savary who praised the impact drug
treatment has had on theft rates, stating, “With health measures, you can have a very big security
impact… You can do both. It’s cheap and effective. It sounds like a miracle, but you can do it”
(Knopf, 2019, para. 53).

35
Findings
Drug war policies are costly and ineffective. In 2017, it was estimated that the United
States had spent more than $1 trillion on drug prohibition since the start of the War on Drugs
(Coyne & Hall, 2017). However, this investment has yielded little return as the opioid epidemic
generates an annual expenditure of $504 billion in the United States (Pearl, 2018). In addition to
this expense, the United States has also allocated a large amount of funds to foreign drug control.
This can be seen in Colombia, Mexico, and Afghanistan. In Colombia, the United States
allocated $540 million annually between 2000 and 2008 to fund military operations related to
drug prohibition (Mejía, 2016). Following this period, the United States spent $1.5 billion
between 2008 and 2011 to fund the Mérida initiative in Mexico (Mercille, 2011). Likewise, in
2016, the United States reported a total of $8.4 billion had been allocated towards the War on
Drugs in Afghanistan (Coyne et al., 2016). Drug war funding had no impact on drug production
in any of these countries with all three noting increases in either cultivation or drug production.
Between 2000-2006, while Plan Colombia was in full effect, cultivation and production rates
rose by 15% and 4% respectively (Guardiola-Rivera & Koram, 2019). Between 2005 and 2009,
Mexico reported substantial increases in opium and cannabis production, with average opium
production increasing from 71 tons to 425 tons, and cannabis production from 5,600 hectares to
17,500 hectares (Mercille, 2011). Around this same time, Afghanistan experienced significant
increases in opium production, reporting a 60% increase between 2005 and 2006 (UNODC 2006,
as cited in Coyne et al., 2016). The United States publicly acknowledged that these policies had
failed with representative Richard Holbrooke stating that the United States government had
“‘wasted hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars’ on efforts to combat opium production
with no positive results to show for it” (Donadio, 2009 as cited in Coyne et al., 2016). Studies in
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the United States have shown that allocating money to drug treatment is much more effective
than funding prohibition policies (Caulkins as cited in Donohue, 2012). For example, it is
estimated that $1 million spent on substance abuse treatment results in cocaine consumption
decreasing by an average of 103.6 kg, while the same amount spent on longer sentences reports
only 12.6 kg decrease (Caulkins as cited in Donohue, 2012). If funding in the United States,
Colombia, Mexico, and Afghanistan, were dedicated to drug treatment rather than prohibition it
is likely that these policies would have a much greater impact on rates of drug use.
The War on Drugs creates unsafe communities. In New York City, a study found that 40
percent of all homicides were thought to be directly related to the illicit drug market (Coyne &
Hall, 2017). Similarly, in Colombia, it is believed that between 1994 and 2008, more than 57,000
Colombians died because of drug-related violence (Mejía, 2016). Of the 220,000 Colombians
who are said to have been killed or missing because of the drug war and the counter-insurgency
movement, this proportion is small (Guardiola-Rivera & Koram, 2019). Mexico reported similar
increases in violence related to the War on Drugs. In 2007, Mexico reported a homicide rate of
8.5 percent (Durán-Martinez, 2015). By 2011, this number had risen to 24.22 percent (DuránMartinez, 2015). These increases were even more significant in areas with a large cartel presence
such as Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, and Culiacan (Durán-Martinez, 2015). Between 2007 and 2008,
Ciudad Juarez reported over a 700 percent increase in homicides (Durán-Martinez, 2015).
Although there is no cartelized drug market in Afghanistan, it is directly tied to terrorist
organizations. United States intervention in Afghanistan led to a significant increase in violence
between 2005 and 2006 (Glaze 2007). During this period, terrorist attacks against the Karzai
government, NATO, and U.S. troops rose from 1,558 and 4,542 (Glaze, 2007). Increases in
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violence in New York City, Colombia, Mexico, and Afghanistan reveal that actions taken in the
War on Drugs are not only unsustainable, but harmful to the public.
The War on Drugs not only increases rates of violence but rates of overdose, disease
transmission, and drug use. The United States reported more deaths were caused by opioid
overdose than car accidents in 2016, approximately 42,249 deaths (Pearl, 2018). This issue is
exacerbated by the criminalization of drugs as there are no checks performed to check the quality
of illicit drugs and tainted products continue to flood the market uncontrolled (Coyne & Hall,
2017). As drug users fear legal repercussions, they are less likely to report contaminated
substances and are more likely to seek out stronger products and ingestion methods, thereby
increasing the risk of overdose (Coyne & Hall, 2017). In turn, this increases risks of infection
and vascular damage as intravenous drug users are more likely to rush injection due to fear of
police presence (Alexandris Polomarkakis, 2017). Consequently, this fear deters people suffering
from addiction from accessing services such as syringe exchange programs (Blunthenthal et al.,
as cited in Alexandris Polomarkakis, 2017). As drug users were responsible for 60% of new
hepatitis C cases in 2000, this is a dire public health issue (Coyne & Hall, 2017). This crisis is
further highlighted by the fact that in 2012, 91,000 had contracted HIV/AIDS because of
intravenous drug use (Coyne & Hall, 2017). In Mexico, drug use is significantly worsened in
areas with cartel presence (Brouwer et al., 2006). For example, Tijuana reported rates of illicit
drug use in adults aged 12-65 that were three times the national average in 1998, 14.7% and
5.3% respectively (SSA, 1998 as cited in Brouwer et al., 2006). This can also be seen in other
regions where cartels are strong, such as Ciudad Juarez, where the drug abuse rate in 1998 was
about 9.2% (SSA, 1998, Brouwer et al., 2006 cited). Drug abuse has a significant impact on rates
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of disease transmission and overdose; therefore, it is an issue of public health and safety both in
the United States and abroad.
People often get involved in drug trafficking and production out of necessity due to a lack
of viable employment opportunities. For example, in New Haven, Connecticut, black men are
more likely to be convicted of drug crimes than white men despite reporting similar rates of drug
use and sales (Rosenberg et al., 2017). Once convicted, they are more likely to be barred from
receiving financial aid, housing benefits, and job opportunities (Rosenberg et al., 2017). As a
result, black men in New Haven report significantly higher rates of unemployment than white
men, approximately 25% compared to 12% (Rosenberg et al., 2017). This disparity not only
leads to poverty within the black community of New Haven but perpetuates the cycle of
incarceration as they have few opportunities outside of drug trade (Rosenberg et al., 2017).
Correspondingly, in Colombia and Mexico, farmers are forced into drug production and
trafficking due to massive job losses sparked from an inability to compete with American
subsidized crops (Guardiola-Rivera & Koram, 2019; Mercille, 2011). In Mexico alone, there
were a reported 2.3 million agricultural jobs lost (Mercille, 2011). As a result, farmers turn to
more profitable crops such as opium gum, which reports an average profit of $700 to $1200 USD
per pound (Lloyd, 2003 as cited in Bucardo et al., 2005). To put that into perspective, coffee
averages a mere 15 cents per pound (Lloyd, 2003 as cited in Bucardo et al., 2005). Likewise, in
Afghanistan, traditional crops such as wheat, corn, and barley are unsustainable due to drought
and lack of suitable farmland (Glaze, 2007). Opium serves as both a drought-resistant and more
profitable alternative (Glaze, 2007). Although the profit of one hectare of wheat is about $266
USD, the profit per hectare of opium is about $4,622 USD (Glaze, 2007). With a lack of
legitimate employment opportunities for disadvantaged populations, both in the United States
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and abroad, many are forced to turn to drug production and trafficking in order to support
themselves and their families.
Drug prohibition not only fails to address economic disparity associated with drug
trafficking/production but contributes to racial inequality. As a member of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the United States has a
responsibility to address policies and laws that perpetuate racial discrimination (Fellner, 2009).
However, despite this, drug prohibition policies in the United States continue to target black
Americans at a disproportionate rate. This issue is highlighted by the fact that black men in the
United States are more likely to be incarcerated than to attend college (Nicosia et al., 2013).
Shockingly, there were more black men incarcerated in 2001 than were enslaved in 1820 (Boyd,
2001). This inequality has continued to grow as in 2009, it was reported that black Americans
accounted for 38% of the prison population despite constituting a mere 13% of the total
population (Nicosia et al., 2013). This difference in imprisonment is not only observed at the
national level but is also evident in analyses carried out at the state and city levels. For example,
in California, from 1980 to 2003, the number of black American drug arrests increased by 225%,
while the number of white American drug arrests increased by 70% (Fellner, 2009). In Seattle,
Washington, although white residents account for most people who have ever shared, sold, or
transferred illicit drugs, black residents make up 64.2% of all drug arrests (Fellner, 2009). This
disparity is observed from coast to coast as black people in New Haven, Connecticut are 8.24
times more likely to be arrested for drug sales than the white residents of New Haven (Rosenberg
et al., 2017). Analysis conducted at the federal, state, and local levels shows that discrimination
against black Americans in arrests and convictions is not an isolated example, but a national
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phenomenon. It is critical that these policies are analyzed and amended in order to further
equality in the United States.
As incarceration undermines equality and is ineffective at combating drug use, alternative
programs should be put in place. Studies have shown that social services, such as syringe access
programs and supervised injection facilities, are effective tools to combat the impacts of drug
use, such as overdose rates and disease transmission. For example, rates of hepatitis B and C
transmission fell by 80 percent after syringe access programs were implemented in Washington
state (Pearl, 2018). Likewise, Washington D.C. saw a 70 percent decrease in new HIV infections
in the two years following the implementation of these programs (Pearl, 2018). Portugal reported
similar results after national decriminalization with HIV transmission rates falling more than 90
percent since 1999 (Kristof, N). This change marks a significant milestone for Portugal, as they
reported the highest number of drug-related AIDS cases in the European Union in 1999 (Kristof,
N). Switzerland celebrated a similar milestone as they reported a 65 percent decrease in new HIV
infections between 1991 and 2010 after reporting the highest number of new cases in Western
Europe in 1986 (Wolf & Herzig, 2019). This is largely due to the success of the Swiss four-pillar
model, which emphasizes both treatment and harm reduction (Wolf & Herzig, 2019).
Correspondingly, upon establishing safe injection sites, Vancouver, British Columbia observed a
decrease in overdose fatalities and an increase in the number of patients seeking substance abuse
treatment (Pearl, 2018). Similarly, the Netherlands reported more safe injection sites and needle
replacement programs than most regions in Europe. In turn, their reported overdose deaths are
lower than the European average, with 10.2 deaths per million people reported in the Netherlands
(Chatwin, 2016). On the other hand, the probability of overdose death among people incarcerated
in the United States is 129% higher than that of the general population (Pearl, 2018).
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Imprisonment is not conducive to public health and safety; however, it has been proven that
syringe access programs and safe injection sites can effectively reduce the rate of drug overdose
and disease transmission, while encouraging drug abuse treatment.
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Recommendations
This study has shown that drug prohibition policies implemented by the United States
both domestically and abroad are ineffective in reducing crime and detrimental to public health
and safety. However, decriminalization has proven to be effective in fighting crime, while
simultaneously curbing the spread of disease and drug overdose. Due to the severity of the opioid
epidemic in the United States and the inequality caused by the global drug war, the United States
should make policy changes. These changes should be made at the local, state, national, and
international levels.
Local
There are localities plagued by the drug epidemic disproportionately to other areas in
their home state. As demonstrated in Switzerland, communities can work together to improve the
outlook of those suffering from addiction. This requires the cooperation of medical professionals,
law enforcement, social workers, and local organizations such as churches. Based on my
research, the following changes should be made:
● Social workers and medical professionals should advocate for policy change at the local
level based on their professional experience with people battling addiction. This would
contribute to community-wide awareness of substance-abuse disorder and how
prohibition policies harm disadvantaged communities.
● Local organizations such as churches and food banks should provide assistance to drug
users by providing hygiene products such as clean water, gauze, and antiseptic. This
action could have an impact on rates of disease transmission.
● Law enforcement officials should receive education on the impacts of substance-abuse
disorders in addition to attending seminars on racial discrimination and profiling. This
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has the potential to create a police force that is more equipped to deal with citizens
exhibiting signs of drug use. In turn, learning about the harms of racial profiling may
contribute to future equality in convictions.
● Local judiciary members should educate themselves on the impact of addiction and
consider sentencing minor drug offenders to court-ordered rehab for all or a portion of
their sentence. Drug users are often deterred from seeking treatment due to the stigma
associated with illicit drug use. Although it is proven that incarceration aggravates the
mental health of people suffering from substance abuse disorders, rehabilitation provides
resources to help drug users transition to a sober state.
● Localities battling the opioid epidemic should implement needle exchange programs and
safe injection sites. Not only can these programs effectively curb overdose and the rate of
disease transmission, but they provide a cost-effective alternative to emergency response.
State
While local municipalities can advocate for change and provide social services,
institutional change should be enacted at the state level. Through amending laws, creating
programs, and redirecting resources, states can address issues of both inequality and public
health and safety. The following actions should be taken on the state level:
● Minor drug offenses should be expunged. As minorities are often the target of law
enforcement, minor drug offenses disproportionately affect them by barring them from
jobs opportunities, financial aid, and other forms of public assistance. Correcting this
would not only be a step toward equality, but these actions have the potential to improve
employment and education rates in minority communities.
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● Rehabilitation programs should be created as an alternative to incarceration. Since the
rate of overdose is highest among those who have been released, rehabilitation may have
a major impact on health across the state.
● After the rehabilitation program is completed, individuals who were previously detained
should be referred to a reintegration program. These programs should aid these
individuals in finding employment and housing, while connecting them with resources
for managing addiction. The implementation of these programs has the potential to not
only improve employment rates, but to deter criminal activity as previous offenders are
connected with alternative means of employment.
● Law enforcement should be directed to prioritize drug trafficking over possession.
Punishing drug addicts for possession does not reduce the rate of drug abuse. On the
contrary, the legal fines they bear may encourage drug addicts to obtain funds through
illegal means. As seen in Switzerland, this could lead to a drop-in theft rate.
● State governments should consider decriminalizing possession of small amounts of drugs.
In doing so, the public’s fear of law enforcement may be lessened, increasing the
likelihood that drug users seek out therapy and public programs such as needle exchange
programs. In turn, this rescheduling could allow law enforcement officials to refocus their
efforts on fighting more serious crimes.
National
Today, efforts to combat drug use are not organized at the national level. As a result, drug
criminalization and available social services vary widely from state to state. In response, the
United States should exercise its authority by organizing studies, implementing programs, and
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changing policies at the national level. The following changes should be made at the national
level:
● The United States should organize nationwide studies on the impact of programs such as
syringe exchange programs, safe injection sites, and methadone replacement therapy.
While studies have been conducted on these topics within the United States, they have
not been studied on a national scale. Through research, the government could better
inform lawmakers and healthcare professionals about the benefits of these programs as an
alternative to prohibition.
● The United States should allocate a portion of its drug control budget to the development
of rehabilitation centers and public health programs in areas that are affected by
addiction. Because the opioid epidemic costs the United States a significant amount of
money each year, these programs may not only improve public welfare, but also the
national deficit.
● Since the states are very divided on issues related to drug control, the United States
should propose an action plan. If the research is completed, the United States should
share these results with state officials, outlining how the implementation of certain
policies and programs will financially affect the state and improve public health.
● The United States should consider adopting a stance on drug control by decriminalizing
the possession of small amounts of drugs at the national level. This may not only
encourage apprehensive states to follow suit, but further eliminate the fear of legal
repercussions among drug users who are actively seeking treatment.
● The United States should seek to remedy racial inequality by encouraging states to
expunge records of minor drug offenses. They should issue a public debriefing on
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disparities in convictions for minorities, inviting experts and individuals who have been
impacted by these policies to speak on a national platform. This may not only increase
public awareness but may trigger political change.
International
The United States allocates large amounts of funds to drug war policies in Colombia,
Mexico, and Afghanistan each year. Despite this exorbitant spending, these policies have proven
to be largely ineffective at combating drug production and trafficking. These policies are not
only ineffective, but harm local communities due to increased rates of violence in areas where
they are in effect. In turn, these policies do little to benefit disadvantaged communities. The
United States should attempt to undo the damage caused by their interdiction efforts in these
countries by funding efforts outside of militarization. The United States should consider the
following changes to its global drug control policy:
● The United States should eliminate the process of aerial spraying as it is both costly and
ineffective. In turn, it has been discovered that the chemicals used in this process can
damage natural resources and have a negative impact on the health of civilians. This
process has exacerbated inequality in these regions, so the United States should address
damage done to local communities.
● The United States should withdraw a significant number of military personnel and DEA
officials from Colombia, Mexico, and Afghanistan. The United States’ military presence
has been correlated with increased instances of violence against civilians and military
personnel alike; thus, their presence has a negative impact on public safety in these
countries.
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● If the United States is to continue to intervene in these countries, it should allocate funds
to alternative livelihoods, crop replacement programs, and economic development rather
than the military. Drug trafficking and trade is common among farmers in these countries
as they could not compete with prices of American subsidized crops. As a result, a lack of
viable employment opportunities directly contributes to participation in this market.
● Companies headquartered in the United States should be required to pay workers equal to
their cost of living. In Mexico, the informal job market supported by American
companies exploits Mexican workers. As a result, many workers turn to illegal drug
production and trafficking. If legitimate companies provided adequate wages,
manufacturing jobs could potentially compete with work provided by local cartels.
● The United States should eliminate the practice of granting asylum to paramilitary
members under the Convention Against Torture. Because these members are often
associated with the deaths of thousands of people and the trafficking of large quantities of
drugs, their sentencing rate is lower than that of minor drug traffickers in the United
States. In turn, granting asylum prevents sentencing from being carried out in the home
countries of these paramilitary members, leaving the citizens in these countries without
justice for their family members and communities.
These actions taken at home and abroad may alleviate the inequality caused by the global
drug war. By implementing policy changes, establishing social services, and raising awareness,
the United States can work to correct harmful policies that have directly led to overdose deaths,
disease transmission, and inequality on an international scale. As an international power, the
United States should follow the example of other first-world countries, such as Portugal, the
Netherlands, and Switzerland, by adopting a progressive drug policy. Through adopting a
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strategy that highlights education, harm reduction, and rehabilitation, the United States can
improve health, public safety, and equality for citizens of America and countries abroad.
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Conclusions
In order to fight the opioid epidemic, the United States must take an alternative approach
to drug control. Studies reveal that prohibition policies have not decreased drug use, but instead
are associated with increased rates of overdose and disease transmission. Rates of overdose
among previously incarcerated individuals reveal that drug prohibition policies do little to
address the link between mental illness and substance abuse disorders. As the number of reported
overdose deaths continues to rise, it is vital for the United States to take action to maintain public
safety. What’s more, prohibition policies have failed to address growing rates of HIV, hepatitis
B, and hepatitis C among drug users. This represents a dire public health issue that should be
prioritized by policy makers.
At the same time, these policies exacerbate racial inequality as minorities are arrested for
drug possession at a disproportionate rate. Overwhelming evidence shows that black Americans
do not use or traffic drugs at higher rates than white Americans; therefore, higher rates of
conviction among black Americans reveal that they are the victims of a corrupt and unjust
system. This is supported by studies conducted on exonerations within the United States as the
vast majority of defendants belong to minority groups. As a member of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the United States has a
responsibility to resolve the issue of discrimination in drug convictions among minorities. The
impact of drug prohibition on minority populations can be considered one of the largest human
rights issues in the United States. In order to ensure that minorities are given equal access to
public assistance, financial aid, and job opportunities, historical inequality in drug convictions
must be addressed.
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In addition to perpetuating inequality within the United States, drug war policies
implemented abroad have harmed local resources and communities, while failing to solve the
unemployment problem triggered by US subsidized crops. This phenomenon is not isolated and
can be observed in Colombia, Mexico, and Afghanistan. Rather than investing in alternative
livelihoods and crop substitution programs, the United States emphasizes military intervention as
the primary solution to drug trafficking and production. Facts have shown that this approach not
only fails to effectively reduce the number of drugs produced, but also exacerbates violence in
communities with large numbers of military personnel. In addition, the practice of aerial
spraying is thought to contribute to pollution, deforestation, and numerous health problems. As a
result, local communities are affected by their environment, violence, and unemployment
perpetuated by the United States’ global War on Drugs. Despite overwhelming evidence that
these policies have been ineffective, they continue to be implemented by the United States in an
effort to strengthen relationships with foreign military powers.
By implementing policies that have proven effective abroad, the United States can
potentially reduce drug-related expenditures, disease transmission rates, overdose deaths, crime,
racial inequality, and the number of problematic drug users. Significant progress was observed in
European countries such as Portugal, the Netherlands, and Switzerland after implementing a
strategy of treatment and harm reduction. Similar programs, such as syringe exchange programs
and safe injection sites, have been implemented in Washington state and Washington D.C. These
programs have proven to be effective at combating the opioid crisis locally; however, harm
reduction strategies have not been implemented on a national scale. In order to implement these
changes, lawmakers, medical professionals, social workers, and civilians alike must advocate for
policy change. As seen in Switzerland, advocating for change at the local level has the potential
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to spark a nationwide movement. By recognizing the harm caused by the War on Drugs and
amending these policies, the United States can create a safer and more equal society.
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